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I come for you. My people claim you as the plumed serpent. They say
that the earth and the heavens love you.'
On a ridge high above the west side of town, in palatial if somewhat
isolated surroundings, there lives a retired law professor. He is the
former President of a great nation. He is also a poet. His name is
Jos6 L6pez Portillo y Pacheco.
On September 1, 1982, during his last state of the union address,
President L6pez Portillo, close to tears, dramatically announced the
nationalization of the Mexican banking system.
* Partner, Baker & Botts, Houston, Texas; B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas.
1. J. L6PEZ-PORTILLO, QUETZALC6ATL 17 (5th ed. 1980) (quotation translated by the

author).
2. Decreto Que Establece la Nacionalizaci6n de la Banca Privada, D.O., Sept. 1, 1982
[hereinafter Naturalization Decree] (Decree Which Establishes the Nationalization of Private
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"We have broken the taboos," he said. "The revolution is freeing
itself from fears and speeding up its pace .... Mexico's private banking system has postponed the nation's interest, and it has promoted,
propitiated, and even instrumented speculation and capital flight ....
It is now or never," he cried. "They have already plundered us ....
They will never plunder us again." 3This surprise announcement during President L6pez Portillo's waning days of office was prompted by
Mexico's serious and rapidly worsening economic plight. The privately owned banking system was the natural target for a quick fix.
Three months later, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado became President and inherited the newly nationalized banking system. Even
though many observers felt that the new president opposed the bank
nationalization, he declined to restore the banks to their previous status. On the contrary, he announced that the privatization of the Mexican banking system was "irreversible." 4 After a time, however,
President de la Madrid did sell off substantial portions of the banks'
industrial holdings and he authorized the sale of up to thirty-four percent of each bank's equity in the form of non-voting certificates. 5
While these actions were major developments, the true counterrevolution awaited the next administration.
Today, in the poet's place as chief of state, there sits an economist,
a technocrat. He is not a poet; to his credit he is not even a lawyer.
He is privatizing the banking system. His name is Carlos Salinas de
Gortari.
In mid-1990, President Salinas announced the privatization of the
banking system in a move as surprising, if not as dramatic, as President L6pez Portillo's nationalization announcement less than eight
years earlier.6 By the time of this writing at the end of 1991, the
government had sold, or announced the sale, of nine of the eighteen
government-owned commercial banks. This paper will examine the
Banks). At the same time, draconian exchange controls were enacted. Decreto Que Establece
el Control Generalizado de Cambios, D.O., Sept. 1, 1982 (Decree which Establishes the Generalized Control of Exchange).
3. Sergio Sarmiento, Mexico's PresidentBucks the Banking Taboo, WALL ST. J., May 4,
1990, at All.
4. Id.
5. Shepard Barbash, Sale of Mexico's Bank Shares Successful, But Controversial,AMERICAN BANKER, April 13, 1987, at 2.
6. Iniciativa Presidencial, D.O., June 27, 1990; William Branigin, Mexico to Repeal 82
Bank Takeovers, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 3, 1990, at A33-34.
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above-described events and the processes involved from the perspective of a United States lawyer.
I.

THE PROLOGUE

Both Anglo and Latin Americans enjoy a good tale. The tale of
Quetzalcdatl is one of them. It began with the ancient Toltecs and has
played a significant role in Mexican history at various times since
then, especially during times of intense rivalries between tribes and
when invasions were imminent (like the rivalry between the Aztecs
and the Texcocans, followed by the arrival of the Conquistadors). 7 It
is ironic that President L6pez Portillo would have been the author of
a latter day version of the Quetzalc6atl legend not too long before the
rivalry between the bureaucrats and the private sector, and the invasion of the foreign bankers broke out afresh in the last part of the
twentieth century.
A more gringo-like tale is The Pardoner'sTale of Chaucer. It is far
less reverent but has a moral tone as well. Medieval pardoners traveled as agents of the Pope who were empowered to forgive sins in
exchange for contributions to worthy causes. Some pardoners fulfilled their responsibilities by turning over their contributions to the
designated cause, keeping only an agreed upon percentage for their
efforts. Unfortunately, many more kept everything for themselves.'
In either event, during their travels the medieval pardoners frequently
confronted the sins of gluttony, gambling, profanity, and greed. So
too, in modem Mexico the bankers and their host, the Mexican government, confront similar sins in the travels of the Mexican banking
system. This then is The Bankers' Tale.
II.

PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE NATIONALIZATION:

A TIME OF

GLUTTONY OR WISE CONSUMPTION?

The economic miracle which Mexico had experienced from the
1940s to the 1960s began to turn sour by the late 1960s. Many of the
economy's basic problems were, however, hidden by the oil boom of
the 1970s. Political unrest and the oil boom encouraged Presidents
Echeverria and L6pez Portillo to take populist approaches in eco7.

JONATHAN KANDELL, LA CAPITAL 66-75 (1988).
NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE

8. 1 THE
1962).
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nomic policymaking. They focused on the inequitable distribution of
wealth and the country's perceived dependency on foreign capital in
ways which, it turned out, only exacerbated the problem.
In the 1970s, restrictive laws on foreign investment and technology
were implemented; existing restrictions on the importation of foreignmade goods were retained. Protectionism reigned supreme. Public
spending both on social infrastructure as well as on projects of industrial aggrandizement was massively increased. Inflation, which had
been negligible since 1950, took off. The deficit in the country's external account tripled during President Echeverria's administration,
driving him ultimately to devalue the rate of the peso to the dollar
from one which had remained constant since the early 1950s.1
If outside observers thought President Echeverria's actions were excessive and ruinous for his country, they had yet to examine the major
league profligacy of President L6pez Portillo. He will be remembered
as the president who squandered the opportunities presented by the
great oil boom and who created the environment for an unusually
high degree of corruption by a relatively few but highly placed government officials, paraestatalexecutives and union leaders.
Much of the money was coming from bankers, both foreign and
domestic. One must ask why they discarded their normal credit standards in dealing with Mexican borrowers (and with other even less
promising third world borrowers as well). The oil was there but
Pemex had an abysmal reputation for inefficiency (including an abnormally high cost for finding and producing oil) which was camouflaged only as long as the price of oil remained at stratospheric
heights. Some of the funds were being used for worthwhile purposes,
but what were to be the sources of repayment if the oil price fell?
The private sector joined the public sector in the spending binge.
During President L6pez Portillo's term, Mexico's public and private
sector together borrowed sixty billion dollars abroad. Towards the
end, the borrowings did little more than cover up the eroding value of
the peso. An artificially propped-up peso and a declining faith in

9. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment, D.O., Mar.
9, 1973; Law on the Registration of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation
of Patents and Trademarks, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972; JONATHAN KANDELL, LA CAPITAL 541
(1988); Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrbn Wall: Two Perspectiveson Foreign Investment
and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 142-44 (1982); Mexico Survey, THE ECONOMIST,

Sept. 5, 1987.
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Mexico's institutions prompted a massive outflow of Mexican capital
to banks, stock brokers, and condominium developers north of the
Rio Bravo.
Many officials were trying valiantly to stem the tide by aiming at
the causes of the problem.10 However, too little was done too late.
Oil prices collapsed in 1981. The government could no longer maintain the value of the peso. In spite of L6pez Portillo's February 5,
1982 protestations that he would "defend the peso like a dog," the
Central Bank allowed the peso to float beginning on February 17,
1982.11 The free market rate for the peso dropped from 25.66 pesos
to the dollar on February 17, 1982 to 150 pesos to the dollar in De12
cember of the same year.
When construction of L6pez Portillo's palace complex became
known to the general public, it was christened la colina delperro (Dog
Hill), in honor of the President's hollow promise to adopt canine behavior in defending the peso. Dog Hill also became a symbol of the
corruption and waste which plagued L6pez Portillo's regime.
III.

THE NATIONALIZATION:

A GAMBLE OR THE ONLY WISE

COURSE OF ACTION?

Banking has suffered a checkered history throughout the world, especially in capital poor areas. One of the early disagreements between
Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats in the capital poor United
States of the early 1800s was whether, and to what extent, the federal
government should be involved in banking.' 3 In chronically poor
Texas, the state constitution expressly prohibited the chartering of
10. For example, in April of 1982, Lic. Miguel Mancera Aguayo, Director General of
Banco de Mdxico (the Central Bank), published an impressive monograph explaining why exchange controls don't work. Banco de M6xico, S.A., Inconveniencia del Control de Cambios
(1982). Less than six months later, exchange controls were in effect and the Mexican banks
were nationalized; Lic. Mancera had resigned and he had been replaced by the mastermind
behind those cataclysmic events, Carlos Tello Macias, a Marxist economist who advocated
pre-Perestroika Eastern European-type policies for Mexico.
11. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Expropriationand Aftermath: The Prospectsfor Foreign Enterprise in the Mexico of Miguel de la Madrid, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 431, 437 (1983); Peso Under
Pressure;Trade Surplus, Reserves Dwindle, LATIN AMERICA WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 4, 1988,
at 7.
12. Stephen Zamora, Peso-Dollar Economics and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange
Controls in Mexico, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 102-04 (1984).
13. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank, 385 U.S. 252, 256 (1966). See generally McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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banks until 1904. Even today the Texas Constitution prohibits foreign corporations from carrying on a banking business in the state. 14
Similarly, in Mexico, a capital poor part of the world after its independence from Spain, laws discouraged bankers but did not necessarily deter money lenders. In fact, the Church became an important
source of loans for agricultural development at favorable interest
rates. Also merchants and factors took up the slack when "bankers,"
per se, were not available. 5 The same thing happened after the 1982
nationalization of the banks as the government soaked up all available
bank credit for its own purposes and a "parallel" banking system

emerged. 16
Yet, banks are more often needed in bad times than in good times if
they are adequately capitalized, sufficiently responsible, and not unduly restrained. Unfortunately for the banker, his tale of woe is that
when he is most needed, he is most maligned. He was needed in 1982
in Mexico but he was a perfect scapegoat for the problems of the era.
Of course, some of L6pez Portillo's wrath was deserved, but the bankers were a product of the system and the system was brought down as
much by the L6pez Portillo and Echeverria administrations (la
docena trgica) as by the banks themselves. If they had been properly
regulated and encouraged, the evils which L6pez Portillo sought to
eradicate could have been removed without the disastrous side effects
of nationalization (or, as many would call it, confiscation).
According to President L6pez Portillo, the purpose behind nationalizing the banks was to prevent the continued flight of capital from
Mexico. Proponents claimed that nationalization was necessary because the pleas of the president to the dollar-drainers (the sacaddlares)
to stop transferring their wealth abroad had been ignored and the private banking system was the sacaddlares'tool. In announcing the nationalization, the president claimed that he had "a little list" of the
dollar-drainers who were weakening the Mexican economy but he refused to read the list to the public. He could not have read a complete
list in any event because it would have been too long and it would
have included members of his own administration. 7
14. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 16; see Cogan & Nunes, Texas as an InternationalBanking
Centre, in EUROMONEY, INTERNATIONAL BANKING CENTRES 264 (B. Brown ed., 1982).
15. JONATHAN KANDELL, LA CAPITAL 311, 329 (1988).

16. Sergio Sarmiento, Mixico's PhantomBankers Come Out of the Shadows, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 7, 1987, at 21.
17. Robert E. Norton & Teresa Carson, Mexico Nationalizes Its Bank; U.S. Branches
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In fact, the nationalization and the correlative exchange controls
just made matters worse. Chaos reigned in Mexico and recession
came to those parts of the United States most closely linked to the
Mexican economy, such as San Antonio and the Galleria in Houston.
As is so often the case, the politicians aimed at the symptoms rather
than the causes.
The business community of Mexico was stunned by President L6pez Portillo's announcement of nationalization. Mexicans lost total
confidence in their system and a hemorrhage took place. At banks
and foreign exchange houses all over Texas, well-heeled Mexicans
with shopping bags full of pesos were forming long lines to get as
many dollars as they could for their increasingly worthless pesos. The
bankers and businessmen of Mexico claimed that the nationalization
was "socialistic" and "totalitarian" in nature. As one prominent
Mexico City businessman bemoaningly put it to the author shortly
after the September 1 nationalization, "On August 31, I went to bed a
free man; on September 1, I went to bed enslaved in a kind of totalitarian regime I thought would be impossible in my country." Of
course, supporters of the nationalization might have observed that at
least he still had a comfortable place to go to bed, which many of his
fellow countrymen did not.
It did not help matters that the outraged former shareholders considered the compensation for their shares in the banks, when it came,
to be grossly inadequate. It came in the form of government "indemnity bonds" patterned after the bonds used by the French government
to compensate former shareholders of the nationalized French banks.
The trouble was that the Mexican bond was considered by many to be
worth less than twenty-five percent of the true value of the banks. 8
The former owners of the banks sought relief from the alleged injustices by turning to the Mexican courts. The bankers hoped that the
judiciary would enjoin the government from nationalizing the banks.
This hope dissolved when the Mexican Supreme Court voted 15-2
against enjoining the nationalization of the banking system.' 9

There Left Untouched, AMERICAN

BANKER,

Sept. 2, 1982, at 1; Cedric Belfrage, Man Bites

Dog, THE NATION, Oct. 2, 1982, at 293; JONATHAN KANDELL, LA CAPITAL 544 (1988). The

capital that had already "flown the coop" was estimated at nearly $50 billion. Cedric Belfrage,
Man Bites Dog, THE NATION, Oct. 2, 1982, at 293.
18. InternationalNews-Mexico, UPI, Aug. 28, 1983, availablein Westlaw, UPI Database.
19. International News-Mexbriefs, UPI, Nov. 23, 1983, available in Westlaw, UPI
Database.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:753

It is ironic that L6pez Portillo's nationalization was justified by
playing on the twin fears of capital flight and foreign control of the
economy when the nationalization decree conspicuously omitted Citibank (the only foreign bank allowed to maintain a branch in Mexico), Banco Obrero (a union controlled bank-and unions were
notorious sacaddlaresat the time) and the numerous foreign bank representative offices (which were not allowed to take deposits or to handle funds but some of which, nonetheless, were known on occasion to
assist in establishing deposits by Mexicans with the home office.)20
A further irony of the nationalization was that the debts owed to
the foreign banks by the Mexican banks (approximately ten billion
dollars) were now guaranteed by the Mexican government. 21 This was
undoubtedly one reason why the foreign banking community did not
protest the nationalization. The foreign bankers and the government
were also concerned that, without the government takeover, there
would quite likely have been some major failures and insolvencies in
the banking system. In that case, the only alternative to a takeover
would have been a massive bailout (a sort of forewarning of the
United States savings and loan bailout a few years later), which quite
possibly would have been more expensive and even less politically
acceptable.22
President L6pez Portillo put an even more xenophobic gloss to the
situation himself when, as he departed from office, he sought to justify
his actions by saying,
I took the decision to launch Mexico into action in order to escape a
trap permanently laid by a hostile world, organized by the powerful
nations for their own benefit, to ensnare the developing countries....
We had to seize the right moment, a brief opening, to lunge forward
and escalate the trap ....
It was a question of transforming a nonrenewable resource into permanent sources of employment and
production.23

20. Decree which establishes the Nationalization of Private Banks ("Nationalization Decree"), D.O., Sept. 1, 1982.

21. Id.
22. Robert E. Norton & Teresa Carson, Mexico Nationalizes Its Banks: U.S. Branches

There Left Untouched, AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 2, 1982, at 1.
23. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Expropriationand Aftermath: The Prospectsfor Foreign Enterprise in the Mexico of Miguel de la Madrid, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 431, 436 (1983) (quoting from
farewell address); see also L6pez Portillo's subsequent reflections on the fiscal crisis of his
administration in a 1989 interview with Cuauhtemoc Anda Guti6rrez in C. ANDA-GUTIiRREZ, NACIMOs ENDEUDADOS 205-27 (1989).
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IV.

THE PRIVATIZATION: PROFANITY OR WISE COUNTERREVOLUTION?

The privatization did not happen all at once. It came piecemeal.
A.

The Sale of Non-Banking Assets

Because Mexican banks, like many continental European banks,
had over time acquired substantial shareholdings in industrial enterprises, the nationalization of the banking system brought the Mexican
government not only control of the banks, but also, when combined
with the government's existing holdings, control over approximately
sixty percent of the entire Mexican economy.24 Soon after President
de la Madrid took office, he came under pressure to sell shares of the
industrial and commercial enterprises owned by the banks to the private sector. By March of 1984, the Mexican government had decided
to sell share holdings worth four hundred, seventy million dollars in
over seventy percent of the companies it had acquired in the 1982
bank nationalization.25
B.

The Sale of Minority Interests in the Banks

By 1987, President de la Madrid had begun a partial privatization
by selling up to thirty-four percent of the banks' equity by way of nonvoting interests (Certificados de Aportaci6n patrimonial or CAPs) to
the private sector. 26 The reasoning behind these sales was to raise
capital, to discourage continued capital flight, and to build investor
confidence generally. The sales were actually units consisting of
CAPs and debentures convertible into CAPs over a five-year period.
The sale of these units to the investing public constituted the largest
placement on the Mexico City Bolsa up to that time.27
C. The Sale of Control of the Banks
These chinks in the armor of state ownership were encouraging to
24. InternationalNews-Mexico Economy, UPI, July 21, 1983, availablein Westlaw, UPI
Database.
25. International News-Mexico, UPI, Mar. 10, 1984, available in Westlaw, UPI
Database.
26. Shepard Barbash, Sale of Mexico's State Bank Shares Successful, But Controversial,
AMERICAN BANKER, Apr. 13, 1987, at 2.
27. William Branigin, Mexico to Repeal '82 Bank Takeovers; SalinasSubmits Plan to End
'Paternalism',WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 1990, at A33-34.
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the economy. By 1990, the need for foreign and domestic private investment in Mexico was so acute that President Salinas felt it was a
national priority to undo the nationalization of the Mexican banking
system, the "irreversible" act that had occurred only eight years
before. 28 The need to uphold private sector confidence which had
been building with the foreign debt restructuring and privatization
moves in the industrial sector became paramount, totally reversing
the politics of la docena trdgica. The Prague pedants were replaced
by the Chicago boys and their colleagues from Harvard and M.I.T.
Announcing the first sale of controlling interest in a bank back to
the private sector, a headline in El Financieroread "And then there
were 17 . . ."29 With this announcement, the Mexican government

began its great sell-off of its eighteen state-controlled commercial
banks. President Salinas said, "the necessities of the population are so
great that to maintain a major part of public resources tied to the
banks ... would be to distract the state from its social obligations."30

To diffuse opposition, Salinas noted that he was doing nothing more
than what had already been done in countries with socialist governments like France and Portugal and what was being planned in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In any event, the privatization of
the banking system was necessary to keep the private sector assured of
continuing reforms in the structure of the Mexican economy.
Surprisingly, the Multibanco Mercantil auction brought a price
2.66 times book value. This result was at first considered an aberration due to its relatively small size and large number of bidders.
"There is no way people are going to pay that kind of a premium for a
bank the size of Bancomer [one of the largest banks]," said one Mexican investment banker. 3 1 Yet, when the sale of Bancomer was announced the price was even higher, 2.99 times book value, earning for
the government a tidy $2.54 billion for fifty-one percent of the shares
and establishing a favorable price for the remaining shares to be
sold.

2

28. Jane Bussey, Mexico Moves to Free Its Banks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June
18, 1990, at 44.
29. Mike Zellner, And Then There Were 17.... EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, June
24, 1991, at 3.
30. William Branigin, Mexico to Repeal '82 Bank Takeovers; SalinasSubmits Plan to End
'Paternalism',WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 1990, at A33-34.
31. Id.
32. EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 11, 1991, at 3.
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The chart in Appendix A shows the incredibly high multiples that
have been accepted for the banks auctioned through the end of 1991.
This is a far cry from the bleak days just before nationalization when
bank stocks were trading on the bolsa at a mere thirty-seven percent
of book value. Before the sales began, Solomon Brothers predicted
the government might receive six billion dollars for the banks. Now
they estimate the figure could go as high as ten billion.3" And these
numbers do not reflect the proceeds from earlier years of the CAPs
sales and the sell-offs of the banks' industrial holdings-quite a profit
when one recalls that all the government paid for its investment was
government bonds having a face value of seven hundred, sixty million
dollars.34 Although some restructuring of the banks designed to increase value has been undertaken in anticipation of the sales, the high
multiples are difficult for many outsiders to justify.
While government officials are ecstatic about the prices, one fear is
that the banks will be forced into risky loans in order to obtain the
returns necessary to justify the high purchase prices.35 This again
raises the specter of the savings and loan debacle in the United States,
and concern over the extreme cost of a bailout if that becomes
necessary.
Some observers feel that the prices were based on a variety of unsound, speculative factors. These factors include a projected growth
rate double the current growth rate, a halt to the daily devaluation of
the peso, and a boom in the credit business. On the other hand, many
argue that the price for certain banks, even though two to four times
book value, is a shrewd investment because of the potential synergies
created between the other operations of each purchasing group and its
new bank. 36 No Glass-Steagall concerns here.
Although there is some talk of changing the limits, foreigners may
currently own no more than thirty percent of a Mexican bank. As a
result, there has been only minimal interest by foreign investors in the

33. Mike Zellner, Hernandez & Harp-The Hottest Financial Team in Mexico, EL
FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8.
34. Jane Bussey, Mexico Moves to Free Its Banks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June
18, 1990, at 44.
35. Rueben Migueles, et. al., Salinas Details Modernization and Growth, EL FINANCIERO
INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 11, 1991, at 27.
36. Exhibit A includes a brief description of the bank privatizations at the time of writing
(9 out of the 18).
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privatization process.37 Presently a Spanish bank, Banco Nacional
Espafiol de Credito, is the only foreign bank to have participated. It
has purchased a ten percent interest in Banco de Oriente.38
One reason for the lack of interest by foreign investors (particularly
United States and Canadian bankers) in Mexican banks is that the
North American Free Trade Agreement might possibly allow member nations' banks to operate without restrictions in Mexico. 39 The
dilemma of foreign bank participation in the Mexican banking system
is similar to the dilemma which was faced by the Texas banking system in the mid-1980s with Texas' restrictions on United States
"money center" banks as well as on purely foreign banks. Unfortunately for Texas, its provincialism in this regard also had the practical
effect of limiting significant expansion by its own banks into out-ofstate markets. The Texas example has not, so far, been a particularly
enviable one.
While United States' banks have shown no interest in directly investing in Mexican banks by purchasing a piece of a Mexican bank,
they have been willing to participate in the process by financing Mexican investors. For example, in late 1991, J. P. Morgan announced
that it had syndicated a "billion-dollar bridge loan for one year to
support" the Valores Monterrey (VAMSA) group's bid for Bancomer.
In addition, Morgan loaned 120 million dollars in equity to one of
VAMSA's group members.' Aside from acquiring shares in Mexican
banks directly or simply financing Mexican investors, foreign banks
might look for opportunities for participation in the Mexican financial
sector by means other than conventional "commercial" banking.
For example, foreign banks have a great deal to offer to Mexican
banks in the way of technical and management services and franchising. With the repeal of the foreign technology transfer restrictions in
1991, there should be some great opportunities to participate in Mexican banking through the provision of such services in return for a
commercially appropriate royalty or other type of return. 4 1 As the
37. Mike Zellner, Hernadez & Harp-The Hottest Financial Team in Mexico, EL
FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8.
38. EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 11, 1991, at 3.
39. EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 11, 1991, at 3.

40. Id.
41. La Ley de Fometo y Protecci6n de la Propiedad Industrial, pt. II, D.O., June 27,

1991, abrogated the previously restrictive law which discouraged the use of foreign technology
in Mexico.
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Mexican foreign investment restrictions are increasingly eased, many
creative opportunities for active participation in the non-bank financial sector should present themselves.
V.

RULES

How does the privatization work, legally? Shortly after the nationalization decree was issued in 1982, the Constitution was amended to
reserve banking and credit operations exclusively to institutions of the
state. 42 Thus, a constitutional amendment was required for privatization. As a result of President Salinas' initiative on May 2, 1990, the
Constitution was amended to abrogate paragraph 5 of article 28 (the
existing impediment) and to transfer bank employees from their status
as employees of public institutions to private institutions.4 3 Then a
new law of credit institutions and companion laws, decrees, and regulations were promulgated to replace much of the prior legislation regulating banks and credit institutions."
These new pieces of legislation set out the procedures for privatizing the banks. They also regulate the operations and ownership of a
wide range of credit institutions, including financial groups. Essentially, a Bank Privatization Committee (Comite de Desincorporacidn
Bancaria)was established within the Ministry of Finance. Interested
persons are required to register with the committee. Foreigners are
not allowed to acquire more than thirty percent of the capital.
With certain exceptions, no individual or legal entity may acquire
more than five percent of the capital of a bank. One exception to this
limit is that qualified holding companies (sociedades controladoras)
may acquire up to one hundred percent of the capital of a bank.
However, with certain limited exceptions, no individual or legal entity
can own, directly or indirectly, more than five percent of a qualified

42. CONST. art. 28, para. 5 (Mexico 1984).
43. Decreto Que Deroga al Pfirrafo Quinto del Articulo, D.O., June 27, 1990 (decree
which deletes the fifth paragraph of Art. 28).
44. This package includes the new Ley de Instituciones de Cr6dito, D.O., July 18, 1990;
Ley para Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras, D.O., July 18, 1990 (Law to Regulate Financial Groups); Acuerdo Que Establece los Principios y Bases del Proceso de Desincorporaci6n
de las Sociedades Nacionales de Cr6dito, D.O., Sept. 5, 1990; Bases Generales del Proceso de
Desincorporacion, D.O., Sept. 25, 1990; Procedimiento de Registro y Autorizaci6n de Interesados en Adquirir Titulos [de las Instituciones de Banca M6iltiple], D.O., Sept. 25, 1990
(Privatization Procedure); and Reglas Generales Para la Constituci6n y Funcionamiento de
Grupos Financieros, D.O., Jan. 23, 1991.
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holding company. 45
Pursuant to the foregoing legislative package, each bank is converted by decree from a national credit company (SNC) to a joint
stock company (S.A.), ready to be sold to the private sector in the
auction process.4 6 Every effort has been made in the legislation and
the regulations to avoid corruption and insider deals.4 7 So far, the
system seems to be working.
VI.

THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION: GREED OR A STEP
TOWARDS A MORE VIBRANT ECONOMY?

Critics of the 1982 bank nationalization claim it created a crisis4 s in
the Mexican banking sector and the crisis promoted inefficiency and
corruption and had to be undone before the economy could fully
recover.
Before addressing the effects of bank privatization on Mexico, one
must examine the status of the Mexican economy at the time. Inflation had dropped from one hundred, fifty-nine percent in 1988 to between fourteen and fifteen percent per year by mid 199 1, representing
the lowest yearly inflation rate since 1976. Interest rates had dropped
substantially as well. Investor confidence had increased and the Mexico City Stock Exchange took off. In the first six months of 1991,
49
average prices increased by more than sixty percent after inflation.
One economic indicator that is not positive is that overdue loans in
the first half of 1991 increased by 135.6 percent over the same period
in 1990.50
This may not bode well for the banks' new owners. On the other
hand, capital ratios, a measure of banks' financial strength, average
more than six percent. This is double what it is for the United States
banking system; and demand for credit will be exceedingly strong.
With only eighteen or twenty institutions (down from one hudnred,
45. Privatization Procedure, Item 2; Law to Regulate Financial Groups, art. 20; Atlantico, Aspectos Principales de las Reformas Constitucionales y Promulgaci6n de Nuevas Leyes
Relacionadas con el Sistema Financiero (1990).
46. See, for example, the Decree Transforming Banco Nacional de M6xico, S.N.C. into
Banco Nacional de M6xico, S.A. (Banamex), D.O., Aug. 16, 1991.
47. ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 1991, at 81.
48. Herb Vest, The Fast Pace of Bank Privatization, EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL,
Sept. 9, 1991, at 8.
49. Id.
50. EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 21, 1991, at 3.
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twenty in 1981, thanks to a post-nationalization consolidation) serving the domestic banking needs of over eighty million people in Mexico (compared to some fourteen thousand banks in the United States),
the banks can afford to be highly selective in going forward with
building their loan portfolios. They also can now be more creative in
the services they offer and in pricing. Of course, the oligopolistic
structure could change if the government were to grant new banking
concessions but this is not likely to happen any time soon. Also,
opening the economy to greater participation by foreign banks as discussed below will have a significant impact on the newly privatized
banks' well being.
In any event, an immediate result of privatization is the new, much
more competitive environment in which the banks will operate. In
order to compete, banks will be forced to cut costs even further. The
Mexican government, in its final days as a bank owner, had made
some cuts in order to increase the value of banks. For example, the
staff of Bancomer had been reduced twenty percent "by 'voluntary
retirement' and liquidation of 7,370 employees."51 Now, the new
owners will need to reduce staff even more. Banamex has already
announced a post-privatization personnel cut of at least thirty percent
nationwide. Even though officials of Banamex claim that the measure
is strictly voluntary, bank officials are offering incentives to more than
thirty-four thousand less experienced employees to quit. 52 With steep
cuts like these in Mexico's largest two banks, it is very likely that the
remaining banks will also have to make steep cuts in order to remain
competitive.
In addition to cost cutting, massive new investments will be needed
to upgrade systems and to increase the size and ability of credit analysis departments. This is particularly true if the banks are going to
reduce the risk of further bad loans. Because of the high book value
paid for the banks and the increased competition, the pressure to increase revenue by making risky loans may increase.53
While President L6pez Portillo's nationalization of the banks in
1982 was done ostensibly to prevent the flow of capital out of Mexico,
the privatization of the banks by President Salinas was done with the
51. SHORT TAKES, EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 28, 1991, at 3.
52. Corporate News Reports, EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 7, 1991, at 6.
53. Mike Zellner, Banamex's Success Not Automatic, EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL,
Sept. 9, 1991, at 7-8.
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goal of attracting more capital to Mexico.54 In spite of apparent initial interest in the Mexican banks by at least some United States bankers, President Salinas' goal of substantial direct foreign investment in
Mexican banks simply has not occurred (except for the relatively
modest Spanish investment in Banco de Oriente). 5
Foreign bankers are obviously disappointed about the limitation of
foreign ownership to only thirty percent of any bank and the uncertain financial condition of many Mexican banks. But there is more to
it than that. For instance, banks traditionally prefer to operate
through branches rather than subsidiaries for economic reasons; further, they are concerned about whimsical regulation which might dry
up credit or send costs skyrocketing; and, for U.S. and Canadian
banks, at least they might get a better deal if they wait for the North
American Free Trade Agreement. With respect to inopportune regulation, the August 1991 reserve requirement regulations imposed by
Central Bank Director General Miguel Mancera Aguayo (the same
man who criticized regulatory tampering with foreign exchange in
1982 before resigning) caused a temporary credit crunch and substantial losses to the commercial banks.
VII. THE FUTURE
The factor that could have the greatest impact on not only the future of the privatized Mexican banks (and on whether the book value
paid for the banks will be determined to have been unreasonably high)
will be the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement currently under negotiation. Mexican financiers meeting in October of
1991 in Acapulco argued that, because of their small size and lack of
modernization compared to banks north of the border, United States
and Canadian banks should be denied access to the Mexican financial
market for five to ten years.5 6 While Mexican bankers are urging the
Mexican trade negotiators to continue restrictions imposed against
foreign banks, banks north of the border led by Citicorp and Bank of
America are urging the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
to call for immediate access for United States banks in Mexico. In
54. Christopher Whalen, Mexico Needs Privatization, But Proposal May Be a Ruse,
May 24, 1990, at 7 (very critical of Mexican policies).
55. John Evans & James R. Kraus, Mexico's PrivatizationPlan Wins Praise, AMERICAN
BANKER, May 7, 1990, at 14; EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 11, 1991, at 3.
56. EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 7, 1991, at 15.
AMERICAN BANKER,
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fact, Jorge Escobar, Vice President of Bank of America's trade and
investment department, asked the USTR to demand that U.S. banks
have:
1) The right to establish branches in Mexico immediately, and, once a
free-trade agreement is signed, full ownership of Mexican banks;
2) Full national treatment by the Mexican government, allowing nationwide branches with peso deposit gathering and lending powers,
on an equal footing with Mexican banks;
3) Full participation of foreign banks in the development of Mexican
capital markets, and authorization to underwrite and trade government and corporate securities; and
4) The right to own leasing and finance company subsidiaries or otherwise engage in these activities, and to compete with financial groups
that have already acquired Mexican banks."
It is a broadly held belief that Mexican banks cannot currently
compete against United States banks.5" As a result, if banks in the
United States are given immediate access to Mexico as they desire, the
price paid in excess of book value for the already purchased Mexican
banks might prove to be a bad investment, especially Since many of
the purchasers of Mexican banks to date have based their purchase
price on the assumption that Mexican banks would remain protected
for five years from competition from banks in the United States.59 On
the other hand, if foreign banks are given the opportunity to acquire
one-hundred percent of the equity of a Mexican bank, the price per
share may actually increase; or at the very least, some foreign banks
might decide to help the government bail out a bank in trouble.
Mexican trade negotiators will be under great pressure from their
constituents to insure the largest protection period possible for Mexico's newly privatized banks. Mexican bankers claim that to allow the
United States banks immediate access to the Mexican banking market
risks the very financial soundness and security of the newly privatized
banks.
Even though Mexican banks are urging that banks from the United
States should remain prevented from immediately being allowed to
open branches of United States banks in Mexico under the free trade
57. EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 16, 1991, at 4.

58. Gregory D. Cancelada, Banking Competitiveness in Question, EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL, OCt. 14, 1991, at 4.
59. Mexico: Government to Reveal Winner of Bank Bidding, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug.
26, 1991, at 4.
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agreement, the Mexican bankers want to preserve their access to the
United States, especially to the large Hispanic population in the
southwestern United States. In fact, Mexican banks have had a presence in the United States since 1978. In 1978, Banamex purchased
California Commerce Bank and in 1982, Bancomer purchased Grossmont Bank in San Diego.'
VIII.

THE EPILOGUE

As noted in the Prologue, since the time of the Toltecs, the people
who inhabit Mexico have been searching for Quetzalc6atl, the plumed
serpent god of civilization, or his descendants to return and rid them
of their troubles. 6 ' So far, they have been disappointed. Perhaps they
have been expecting too much; or, perhaps, the private bankers are
the returning descendants of the plumed serpent god. The real question is twofold. First, will the bankers be like honest pardoners (and
perhaps like descendants of Quetzalc6atl) who work for the just cause
of building the Mexican economy, taking only their fair entitlement
(rather than everything) for themselves? Second, will the Mexican
government as the bankers' host know the difference? The tale is not
over. Let's hope for a happy ending!
Now, Master Pardoner, perk up, look cheerily!
And you, Sir Host, whom I esteem so dearly,
I beg of you to kiss the Pardoner.
"Come, Pardoner, draw nearer, my dear sir.
Let's laugh again and keep the ball in play."
They kissed, and we continued on our way.62

60.

EL FINANCIERO INTERNATIONAL,

Oct. 7, 1991,

at 15.

61. JONATHAN KANDELL, LA CAPITAL 66-75; Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrmn
Wall: Two Perspectiveson Foreign Investment and Licensingin Mexico, 17 TEX INT'L L.J. 135,
135 (1982).
62. CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES 274 (Penguin Classics ed. 1952).
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APPENDIX A
MEXICAN BANKS FOR WHICH BUYERS

WERE ANNOUNCED IN 1991
Bank

Controlling
Buyer

Purchase Price
Controlling Buyer's
(In U.S. Dollars) Other Investments

Multibanco Probursa
Mercantil
de Mexico

204 million

Brokerage, leasing,
bonding, accounts
receivable financing,
warehouse

Banpais

Mexival

181 million"

Brokerage, insurance,
leasing

Cremi

Multivalo res

249 million

Confia

Abaco

297 million

Brokerage, foreign
exchange house
Brokerage, leasing,
insurance, accounts
receivable financing

Oriente

Puebla area
merchants

75 million

Pharmaceuticals, trade,
cattle ranching, leasing
insurance, accounts
receivable financing

Bancrecer

Alcantara Rojas
Group

125 million"

Shoes, transportation,
construction, farming
insurance, exchange
house

Banamex

Accival

3.2 billion

Brokerage

Bancomer

Valores Monterrey 2.54 billion

Beer Brewer

BCH

The Cabal Group 285 million-

Argiculture

Multiple of
Book Value

* Compiled by the author from the authorities cited above.
100% of stock. In other cases, the percentage varies but always constitutes at least a
controlling interest.
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